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Abstract 
This paper argues that the diffusion of concepts and theories from one culture or society to 
another requires the active engagement of a category of agents which I identify as ‘intellectual 
entrepreneurs’. Two historically contrasting cases of the transmission of ideas are examined in 
order to explain the processes whereby alien concepts are diffused across cultures. Foreign ideas 
and concepts that are successfully assimilated into a culture are neither automatically accepted 
nor externally imposed. Rather, knowledge flow succeeds on the basis of selection and 
transformation by local intellectual entrepreneurs who at the same time transform the receiving 
context to accommodate the modified foreign ideas. The activities of individuals, as intellectual 
entrepreneurs, are identified and discussed in order to indicate the processes through which alien 
concepts and theories are diffused into a receiving culture.  
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Introduction 
Two historical cases of the transmission of ideas into China, from ancient India and also 
modern Europe, are examined to explain the processes whereby alien concepts are diffused 
across cultures. The process of knowledge diffusion is treated in terms of the activities of 
‘intellectual entrepreneurs’ who combine ideas in new ways, paying attention not only to the 
selection of alien concepts which they develop, deploy and elaborate but also to the modification 
of the existing culture or intellectual framework into which the transformed concepts are inserted. 
In their combination of elements from both foreign and domestic contexts intellectual 
entrepreneurs make something that had not previously existed and which can operate as a newly 
introduced knowledge only after the resistance of the established intellectual framework is 
overcome.  
The diffusion of foreign knowledge into China has typically been mediated by Chinese 
preferences rather than subjection to alien determination. Indeed, this is an enduring theme of 
Chinese intellectual contact with external forces, of selective apprehension and adaptation, of 
simultaneously appropriating and transforming ideas from foreign sources. This well-developed 
pattern in Chinese history includes the sinicization of Indian Buddhism from the first century to 
the Mongol invasion of the thirteenth century and the two-hundred-and-fifty year period of 
Manchu reign from the seventeenth century. Even the period after the Opium Wars, in the mid-
nineteenth century, until 1949, when China experienced historical subordination to Western 
political, economic and military dominance, the diffusion of knowledge into China principally 
occurred through the engagement of intellectual entrepreneurs who intentionally directed their 
efforts to the development of counter-Western strategies.  
In order to examine the mechanism of knowledge diffusion this paper examines two 
contrasting cases. The diffusion of Buddhism into China during the medieval period occurred 
when China’s integrity was intact. Western modernism, on the other hand, was first introduced 
when China experienced profound political and economic disadvantage generated by Western 
military might. These quite different contexts permit examination of knowledge diffusion which 
accounts for a general transformation of China’s cultural and intellectual milieu. While Buddhism 
was assimilated into a society relatively insulated from foreign influence Western ideas were 
introduced in response to the alien encroachment to which China was subjected. The role of 
intellectual entrepreneurs in both cases is examined to indicate the contrasting but continuous 
ways in which alien thought is adapted to a receiving framework which is itself modified through 
the efforts of intellectual entrepreneurs to adopt, transform and integrate ideas borrowed from an 
alien setting.  
 
The Diffusion of Knowledge and Intellectual Entrepreneurs 
The problem of understanding the transfer of concepts and theories, isolated ideas or 
ideational systems such as religions or technologies and associated techniques from one culture 
to another has been a concern of anthropologists, geographers and historians at least since the 
period of European colonization during the nineteenth century. The mechanism most generally 
referred to in explaining such knowledge flows is ‘diffusion’. There are a number of issues 
surrounding this concept and how it is used in this context. One problem is precisely its 
association with Western colonization and the subsequent claim that the term and its application 
are euro-centric (Blaut 1977; 1987; 1993). In a book with the transparent title The Colonizer’s 
Model of the Geographical Diffusionism and Eurocentric History Blaut (1993: 14-17) argues that 
classical diffusionism holds that the world comprises two sectors, one of these is Europe, where 
invention, innovation and change naturally occurs, and the other – non-Europe – is stagnant, 
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unchanging, traditional and backward. The movement of ideas or products in which ideas are 
embedded is from Europe to non-Europe in the form of diffusion, and in compensation for this 
diffusion of civilizing ideas non-Europe provides raw materials and labour to Europe. While 
Blaut (1993: 26-30) acknowledges that modern diffusionist theory differs from classical 
diffusionism in many respects he insists that its basic propositions remain more or less unchanged.  
Blaut’s critique is an important caution against such influential social theorists as Weber 
(1964), whose argument concerning the ‘uniqueness’ of the West, or what he calls the Occident, 
is premised on the idea, no longer hegemonic (Goody 1996; 2004; Blue 1999), that rationality is 
exclusively located in the historical experience of European institutional and religious 
development and denied to the historical experience of China, India and other Oriental societies. 
But Blaut’s guiding concern ignores the fact that the major social scientific statement of diffusion 
by Kroeber (1940) is not based on the Euro-centricism that Blaut sees as its defining 
characteristic. Kroeber provides a number of examples of cultural diffusion, beginning with the 
‘stimulus’ of Chinese porcelain on eighteenth-century European technology; he goes on to 
discuss ancient Phoenician and Egyptian contact, early Chinese-Japanese diffusion and many 
other cases in which European culture is not even mentioned. This is not to say that Kroeber 
ignores the diffusion of European ideas and technologies into non-European contexts, as in his 
discussion of the development of a Cherokee alphabet. But Kroeber’s wide ranging examples 
tend to support McNeill’s (1988: 75) view that ‘diffusion of skill and knowledge from one 
community to its neighbours and neighbours’ neighbours constitutes the central process of human 
history’. Given the ubiquity of diffusion it is necessary to know how it operates and in particular 
what mechanisms it employs. 
Kroeber’s account of mechanisms is sketchy and suggestive rather than precise. 
Nevertheless he describes some relevant aspects of the process of diffusion that are important 
background considerations. First, Kroeber (1940: 1) notes that diffused cultural material is 
frequently only a fragment of a larger complex or system and these fragments may be placed in a 
context in the receiving culture that is quite unlike their original context. This makes the process 
of diffusion not simply one of transfer but transformation. A connected idea which Kroeber 
(1940: 19) mentions is that diffusion does not operate automatically, the inference being that 
particular creative efforts are required on the part of those in the receiving culture who select and 
appropriate alien ideas and in doing so create something that did not previously exist: in diffusion 
there ‘is historical connection and dependence, but there is also originality’ (Kroeber 1940: 20). 
One problem with classical diffusion theory as it is typically understood, however, is the 
assumption that diffusion simply spreads within a social system and that introduced ideas have an 
internal energy and power through which they spread. This approach simply ignores the social 
agents of diffusion and the processes they initiate and influence. It will be shown that diffusion 
depends on social agents of ‘diffusion items’. ‘Diffusion items’, as Chabot and Duyvendak (2002: 
706) point out, are taken up by ‘critical communities’ or ‘networks of excluded citizens who 
identify new social problems, formulate new modes of thinking and feeling, and develop new 
political and cultural solutions’. The challenge taken up in the present paper is to conceptualize 
these agents and the processes in which they are implicated. To do so it is necessary to 
understand the social location of such agents and their relationship with both ‘diffusion items’ 
and the social system into which they are assimilated. Collins’ (1998) discussion of knowledge 
creation and transmission, rather like Chabot and Duyvendak, holds that ‘networks are the actors 
on the intellectual stage’ (Collins 1998: xviii). But this arguably operates at too high a level of 
abstraction. Collins’ idea that knowledge creation results from participation in networks, 
animated by emotional energy and empowered with cultural capital, is not challenged here. But it 
Intellectual Entrepreneurs & Ideas Diffusion 
 4 
is not merely the ‘social links among those thinkers whose ideas have been passed along in later 
generations’ that generates new knowledge. Some locations within networks serve as more 
‘optimally marginal social spaces’ than others, to use Mclaughlin’s (2001) term, which more 
directly lead to creativity, insight and innovation. Both Collins and Mclaughlin are primarily 
concerned with the link between intellectual networks and innovation, in philosophy and 
psychoanalysis respectively, within common societal settings. This paper, however, is concerned 
with innovation through combinations of ideas across cultural and societal barriers, enacted by 
intellectual entrepreneurs, that is, how ideas are transmitted from one cultural or societal setting 
to another. The discussion to follow focusses on the necessary but neglected process of 
‘combining elements’ from one cultural setting to another, and how it is achieved by the agency 
of the intellectual entrepreneurs involved. 
The social role of an intermediary standing between diffusion items and the social system 
into which that item is introduced becomes clearer in the distinction between ‘diffusion’ and 
‘brokerage’: McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001: 333, 335) note that: ‘Diffusion involves the 
transfer of information along established lines of interaction while brokerage entails the linking 
of two or more currently unconnected social sites … [D]iffusion requires a much lower 
investment of time, entrepreneurship and frame transformation than brokerage’. The concept of 
brokerage, more directly than diffusion, indicates the means through which cultural objects are 
translated from one society to another. But it is not sufficient to say that brokerage is merely ‘the 
formation of new links (or the consolidation of old ones) among transmitters and receivers’ 
(Chabot and Duyvendak 2002: 708). Such an account of brokerage emphasizes the linking role at 
the expense of the creating role required of the translation of alien concepts and theories into an 
entirely new context. The problem is that ‘brokerage’ literally means no more than being a link or 
agent for another. The point raised by McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly in the quotation above is that 
their distinction is between a linkage requiring little facilitation and one demanding, in their 
words ‘entrepreneurship and frame transformation’. Entrepreneurship and frame transformation, 
however, are rather more than brokerage. A similar point is raised in Fine’s discussion of the 
changing reputations of historical figures: ‘[e]ven if reputations are grounded in history, they do 
not just happen: they must be sponsored’ (Fine 2001: 21). Diffusion, like reputation, rather than 
spontaneously emerging requires ‘entrepreneurs’ who, in Fine’s (2001:25) account of their role in 
reputation, ‘use their narrative facility and institutional placement to control the way people 
remember historical figures’. Diffusion, to borrow Lee and LiPuma’s (2002) description of 
circulation, is not simply ‘a form of transmission or delivery’ but ‘a dynamic cultural 
phenomenon’ (see also Aronczyk and Craig 2012). Similarly, in his discussion of international 
circulation of ideas, Bourdieu (1999) emphasizes that ideas are not transmitted of their own 
accord but their movement is consciously constructed and shaped to overcome constant 
resistance. Indeed, when received wisdom or dominant ways are challenged, resistance is 
unavoidably encountered (Frickel and Gross 2005: 207). Entrepreneurship and frame 
transformation, therefore, are terms which refer to complex social mechanisms of cultural 
diffusion in which purposive engagement is implicit. Frame transformation may include what 
Frickel and Gross (2005: 221) describe as ‘packaging and dissemination’ in ways that ‘resonate 
with the concerns of those who inhabit an intellectual field or fields’. Just as importantly, 
however, such packaging and dissemination involves careful innovation. It is necessary to say 
careful innovation because the mechanisms involved are context dependent and therefore require 
attention to both content and reception. 
The diffusion of cultural forms to be discussed below, within the context of Chinese 
history, did not involve a passive reception of foreign ideas but an active and innovative diffusion 
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initiated by persons who carefully selected foreign ideas, de-contextualized them from their 
foreign origin and reorganized, reformulated and transformed them and, finally, re-contextualized 
them into a Chinese cultural framework which they modified. This process involves what Stark 
(1991) calls ‘path dependence’ in his account of the privatization strategies adopted in East 
Central Europe, in which ‘the introduction of new elements take place most typically in 
combination with adaptations, rearrangements, permutations, and reconfigurations of already 
existing institutional forms’. This is the type of activity required to achieve what Kroeber (1940: 
20) calls ‘stimulus-diffusion’, which involves, as noted above, ‘historical connection and 
dependence, but ... also originality’. This engagement is effectively described in Schumpeter’s 
classic statement of entrepreneurial activity. The particular nature of the entrepreneur’s activities 
and approach is in their introduction of ‘new combinations’ into the economy. The general 
possibilities of the operations of entrepreneurship from the economy to the broader cultural arena 
are clear in Schumpeter’s (2008: 84-86) discussion of the relationship between tradition and 
entrepreneurial activity. Established knowledge, Schumpeter (2008: 84) says, ‘does not need to 
be continually renewed and consciously reproduced ... [as it] is normally transmitted almost 
without friction by inheritance, teaching, upbringing, [and] pressure of [the] environment’. The 
introduction of ‘new combinations’, however, which displace or change established knowledge, 
requires ‘a new and another kind of effort of will’, which Schumpeter (2008: 86) says must 
perform two tasks: it must ‘wrest amidst the work and care of the daily round’ a conception and 
realization of ‘the new combination’, and secondly, it must do this against ‘the reaction of the 
social environment against one who wishes to do something new’. The ‘characteristic task’ of the 
entrepreneur, according to Schumpeter (2008: 92) ‘consists precisely in breaking up old, and 
creating new, tradition’. This second crucial aspect of entrepreneurship is typically ignored in 
discussion of both Schumpeter and entrepreneurship. An assumed basis of successful 
entrepreneurial diffusion is shared social and cultural conditions (Rogers 1995: 7; Strang and 
Meyer 1993; Wejnert 2002). Obstacles to entrepreneurship must therefore include social and 
cultural differences or contrasts (Rogers 1995; Kaufman and Patterson 2005). 
The discussion of intellectual innovation and development is typically concerned with 
endogenous changes within established and contiguous fields (Collins 1998; Frickel and Gross 
2005). Such discussions are frequently taken to be representative accounts of intellectual 
innovations as such. The transformation of ideas considered here, however, concern previously 
unconnected fields drawn from exogenous sources and intentionally developed by intellectual 
entrepreneurs to be diffused across distinct even opposed political, intellectual and cultural 
spectrums. The intellectual entrepreneur’s creation does not derive simply from a struggle for 
‘prestige’ or ‘status’ or ‘attention’, emphasized by Collins’ (1998) in his discussion of intellectual 
change, although these may have been incidental outcomes of the activities of those discussed 
below. The drive for change which animated the Chinese intellectual entrepreneurs treated here 
surely included doubt concerning existing paradigms (Kuhn 1970) as well as complaints against 
dominant intellectual practices or expectations (Frickel and Gross 2005). More importantly 
though, a compelling sense of duty and mission to solve problems that transcended their own 
concerns and at the same time gave direction to those concerns, which informed the activities of 
all those who sensed that they were caught in the travails of momentous cultural change, cannot 
be understated in considering the cases of intellectual entrepreneurship discussed below. The 
anguished preoccupations of Kang Youwei (Kang Yu-wei) (1858-1927) are not atypical: ‘I kept 
thinking of how hard people’s lives were, and of how Heaven had given me the intelligence, 
talent, and energy to save them. Feeling deep sympathy for all things and lamenting the times, I 
thus dedicated myself to the ordering of the world’ (quoted in Pusey 1983: 17). According to a 
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recent account: ‘Kang’s quest for modern material civilization was an attempt to lift his country 
from weakness and poverty to wealth and power’ (Wong 2010: 111).  
The concept of the intellectual entrepreneur is developed below in the discussion of two 
cases of cultural diffusion. The introduction of both Buddhism and Western modernism into 
China constitutes major instances of foreign knowledge diffusion which produced significant 
change and had lasting cultural impact. Neither achieved its place in China through official 
endorsement nor foreign force nor through a ‘power’ in the ideas themselves to spread 
automatically. Neither Buddhism nor Westernism was accepted wholesale in China. Those 
Buddhist doctrines and elements of Westernism which have influenced Chinese culture are ones 
which were carefully selected and integrated into existing Chinese thought through 
transformation as ‘sinicized’ knowledge. Foreign ideas are accepted into Chinese intellectual 
heritage subsequent to their modification, mutation and synthesis with pre-existing local 
intellectual and conceptual patterns. And after the inevitable and often protracted resistance of the 
established cultural framework and its defenders are overcome. Such tasks are carried out by 
intellectual entrepreneurs who are able to select and combine foreign knowledge with the local 
stock of knowledge and transform it into effectively new patterns of thought and culture. The 
ideas that have been successfully diffused into China, to borrow Schwartz’s (1985: 21) phrase, 
are ‘precisely the ideas that relate to already existing preoccupations of Chinese who live in 
history as well as in culture’.  
 
Intellectual Entrepreneurs and Sinicization of Buddhism  
Indian Buddhism was the only major ideological and religious import brought into China 
during the medieval period. Only after a series of transformations and local developments of 
accommodation, occupying almost 1000 years, did Buddhism eventually gain sufficient 
prominence in China to become assimilated into a modified Chinese intellectual heritage (Hsu 
2001: 445; Wright 1990: 1-33). During its early years in China Buddhism was regarded simply as 
a foreign discourse; it was practiced only among the missionaries who attempted to proselytize to 
a largely uninterested Chinese population. The political and social environment in China at this 
time was not conducive for Buddhism to proliferate and thrive. During the Han period (206 BC-
220 AD) Confucianism, which had intellectually enriched itself by integrating elements from 
competing local schools of thought, enjoyed the status of an institutional state orthodoxy (Wright 
1959: 15). As a minor alien belief system Buddhism drew no intellectual attention from the 
Confucian literati.  
It should not be concluded from the above remarks that the adaptation of a system of 
thought as a state ideology is sufficient for it to have a pervasive social presence, as 
Confucianism did. Indeed, there was an historical period in a northern Chinese state when 
Buddhism became the state ideology, but this in itself did not translate into its integration into the 
broader compass of intellectual, social or religious life. Around 317 AD the Tuoba people 
established themselves as political rulers in the north and founded Bei Wei, the Northern Wei 
dynasty. The Tuoba had a strong sense of their own ethnic identity and way of living which set 
them apart from the majority ethnic Han population against whom they had a sense of distance 
and even hostility that was occasionally manifest in conflict. Given the strong antipathy between 
the Tuoba and the Han it was unthinkable for the Tuoba rulers of the Northern Wei to adopt 
Confucianism as a state ideology because they saw it as thoroughly Han. Buddhism, as a foreign 
– that is non-Han – discourse had an obvious appeal to the Tuoba, which was re-enforced by 
what they saw as the magical and superhuman elements of Buddhism, close to their own thought 
system (Wright 1959: 55-57). And yet, the upholding of Buddhism by some Tuoba leaders did 
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not provide Buddhism with the prominence it later acquired in China through quite different 
mechanisms.  
While state sponsorship was not sufficient for the domestic acceptance of Buddhism in 
China, neither was it dependent on an increase in the numbers of foreign missionaries active in 
China. It is often argued that the integration of Buddhism into Chinese thought and practice was 
generated by the quantity and authenticity of translation of Indian Buddhist scriptures into 
Chinese (Shen 1996: 47-50; 100-111). The discussion below shows that Chinese acceptance of 
Buddhist doctrine was not generated by such factors but through the endeavors of intellectual 
entrepreneurs to both employ and transform local categories in domesticating an erstwhile 
foreign philosophy. The meaningful diffusion of Buddhism in China began to occur when the 
propagation and proselytizing of Buddhism was transferred from foreign missionaries to local 
intellectual entrepreneurs. The Buddhist doctrines which had an enduring presence and influence 
in China are those which were incorporated into and synthesized with existing Chinese teachings 
and thereby transformed from a foreign Indian Buddhism into a local Chinese Buddhism. This 
process was facilitated by particular developments in Chinese thought and ritual practices, 
especially in Daoism, which effectively functioned as conduits for the sinicization of Buddhism.  
During the second century, toward the end of the Han dynasty and subsequent to it 
immortality cults developed throughout China, especially in the south, which adopted the Daoist 
name although the majority of their sacred texts were more recent than the classics of Daoist 
philosophy, the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi, and their doctrines were eclectic amalgams of local 
folk religions. The practitioners of these cultic religions ‘were particularly desirous of knowing 
whether Buddhism could add to their knowledge of elixirs and practices that would contribute to 
longevity, levitation, and other superhuman achievements’ (de Bary, Chan and Watson 1960: 
273). The interest of Daoist aspirant immortals in the possibilities provided by early Buddhist 
rituals, breathing and gymnastic exercises, dietary management, charms and talismans provided 
an opportunity for missionaries to disseminate these and related aspects of Buddhism and engage 
in translating and transforming those scriptures and developing those practices which enhanced 
intuitive faculties. The Daoist receptiveness to aspects of Buddhism was not only selective but 
also transformative of the Buddhist practices in question. 
By the third century a number of developments converged in providing possible 
opportunities for Buddhism to find a place in Chinese culture. With the breakdown of the Han 
dynasty the influence of Confucianism declined and the appeal of Daoism grew. There was also, 
as a consequence of these political and religious changes, a widespread sense of general social 
and intellectual discontent. Together these trends generated a climate in which new ideas and 
attitudes would become attractive and find potential audiences (Wright 1959: 21-41). But 
whereas a number of social circumstances changed in a way that might have favoured Buddhism, 
as a ‘barbarian’ religion which was antinomous with accepted Chinese cultural norms, it 
continued to encounter doubt, criticism and opposition. Buddhist temples were widely seen as 
constituting a foreign source of loyalty and therefore detrimental to government rule and a 
Buddhist’s life required rituals and commitments that were regarded as violations of the canons 
of established, that is, Chinese social life (Zürcher 2007: 255). These and other issues of concern 
highlighted the notions subject to repackaging and transformation by localizing Buddhist 
intellectual entrepreneurs who now capitalized on existing accepted ideas and beliefs as media of 
diffusion, showing how Buddhist notions were congruent with Chinese cultural norms. 
According to Buddhist apologetics, then, Buddhist temples contributed to social stability and 
prosperity; in their activities and practices, it could be claimed, Buddhists attempted to attain the 
highest perfections of Confucianism and Daoism (Zürcher 2007: 255-256). The ideas of 
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Buddhism, which prior to this time had been seen only as a foreign ideology, now began to be 
articulated in a local Chinese vocabulary and cosmology. As Fang (2002) notes, Buddhism from 
this time is promoted in terms of existing concepts in Chinese philosophies, especially those of 
religious Daoism (also see Tsukamoto 1985). Against the earlier dissemination of Buddhism as a 
set of doctrines that not only originated in India but which were expressed in a South Asian idiom, 
by the third century the forms of Buddhism that prevailed in China was interpreted in terms of a 
Daoist vocabulary and set of concerns (de Bary, Chan and Watson 1960: 273). Indeed, Buddhism 
was so tightly wrapped in Daoist robes that ‘it was common to regard Taoist and Buddhist 
scholars as belonging to a single intellectual trend’ (Fung 1953: 240).  
In popularizing and domesticating Buddhism in China early local converts who operated 
as intellectual entrepreneurs borrowed extensively from Daoism in their translations of Buddhist 
notions and ideas, shaping and accelerating diffusion through ‘culturally analyzed similarities’ 
(Strang and Meyer 1993: 487). The Chinese concept of wuwei (effortless action), for example, 
while not exclusively Daoist – it has a single appearance in Confucius’ Analects (Confucius 1979: 
132) – has a significant role in Daoist thought which is carried across into the sinicized Buddhism 
that emerged in the third century. The Buddhist concept of asamskrta, which signifies an 
uncaused or unconditioned state or existence, is translated as wuwei (Lusthaus 1998: 
G002SECT2). Wuwei was also used for the Buddhist term nirvana (freedom from human 
suffering) (Mou Tzu 1994: 617) although later replaced by a transliteration of nirvana as niepan. 
In its sinicization, Buddhism was shown to be compatible with and not contradictory to Chinese 
traditions. As a strategy to remove resistance, ‘some passages and expressions deemed offensive 
to Confucian morality were bowdlerized or omitted’ (Wright 1959: 36). For instance, instead of 
literally conveying the Indian Buddhist message that ‘the wife comforts the husband’, which 
appears to place a woman in a position of marital control, in the Chinese form of Buddhism the 
phrase becomes ‘the wife reveres her husband’ in order to ensure its conformity with 
Confucianism’s notion of wifely subservience.  
The first text written in the Chinese language about Buddhism, Li-huo Lun (Treatise on 
the Removal of Doubt), composed in the name of Mou Tzu (Mou Zi) in the late second century, is 
widely regarded as ‘an important source of information for students of early Chinese Buddhism’ 
(Chen 1964: 36). The text characteristically addresses a series of questions which arose from 
concerns regarding the foreign origins of Buddhism and aims at removing antagonism to an alien 
ideology. If the way of Buddha was the greatest and most venerable way, then why was it not 
mentioned in the Classics of the Sages and why did Confucius not practice it? Questions of this 
sort were answered in order to dispel any concern and cast off opposition, showing that there was 
no contradiction between Buddhism and Chinese traditions. In answering the questions regarding 
the possibility of a Chinese adherence to the originally foreign doctrines of Buddhism Mou Tzu 
drew on Confucian and Daoist thought in expounding a version of Buddhism that could be seen 
to be compatible with and not challenge accepted Chinese beliefs and understandings.  
From the very beginning in his introduction when answering questions about Buddha 
Mou Tzu (1994: 59-61) employed Chinese rather than Indian idiom through the description of 
Buddha’s amassing ‘the power of the Way [dao]’, ‘yin and yang’ interpenetrating and attaining 
‘nonaction [wuwei] [nirvana]’. Instead of using imported Buddhist categories Mou Tzu 
deliberately utilized familiar Chinese classics, Confucian and especially Daoist notions, to 
remove the reader’s doubt and alienation about as well as antagonism toward a foreign religion, 
indicating that Buddhism was consonant with a Chinese cultural framework. When challenged 
why Emperors Yao and Shun, or the Duke of Chou, or Confucius did not practice Buddhism and 
there was no mention of Buddhism in the Chinese Seven Classics, Mou Tzu (1994: 79) made 
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reference to the Analects and The Record of Rites, both parts of the Seven Classics, to rebuke the 
critic. Mou Tzu makes the point that these four sages studied with teachers from non-classical 
traditions and it was not whether Buddhism was mentioned that matters but whether it is in 
harmony with the classical cultural framework. Similarly, in defending Buddhism’s rejection of 
wealth, position and pleasures, Mou Tzu (1994: 119) drew on both the words of Confucius 
‘Poverty and low station are what men dislike, but even if I did not get them in the right way I 
would not try to escape from them’ and Laozi ‘The five colours make men’s eyes blind, the five 
notes make his ears deaf, the five tastes injure his palate, riding and hunting make his mind go 
wild with excitement; goods hard to come by serve to hinder his progress’. It is, as Keenan (1994: 
10) says, ‘a conscious and creative rhetorical strategy of cultural adaptation (presaging the later 
“matching concepts” methodology), whereby the foreign Buddha and his doctrine are 
progressively mediated in terms of Chinese culture’.  
In overcoming resistance and domesticating an alien Buddhism intellectual entrepreneurs 
not only transformed Buddhist notions but also shifted the Chinese cultural framework through 
reinterpretation and reconstruction of Confucianism and Daoism. Practices which were distasteful 
to Chinese mores, such as the Buddhist monks’ shaving their head, which contravened Confucian 
virtue of filial piety by injuring a body endowed by one’s parents, were rationalized and 
reinterpreted by Mou Tzu (1994: 84) in an argument that ‘Confucius once said, “A man good 
enough as a partner in the pursuit of the Way… need not be good enough as a partner in the 
exercise of moral discretion”’. Mou Tzu made his point through providing a number of 
counterexamples reinterpreting the norm of filial piety that one should excise moral norms 
according to concrete cases. Throughout the text Mou Tzu makes very few references to Buddhist 
scriptures, and when he does he provides no direct citation and instead makes extensive reference 
to Confucian and especially Daoist sources. The primary purpose of the text, then, is not to 
explain Buddhism doctrine but to convince the Chinese reader that Buddhism is not in violation 
of the established Chinese cultural framework and also prepare the Chinese cultural framework 
for reception of Buddhism through reinterpretation of Confucianism and Daoism. By drawing on 
Confucianism and Daoism Mou Tzu is able to demonstrate that while Buddhism had a foreign 
origin its acceptance in China was not contrary to or disruptive of the Chinese intellectual 
heritage. Mou Tzu’s intellectual entrepreneurship is primarily directed to overcoming local 
resistance to a foreign doctrine and reconstructing the Chinese cultural framework in reception of 
a now indigenized Chinese Buddhism.  
While numerous schools of Indian Buddhism were imported to China over a period of 
more than three hundred years only those which were synthesized with Chinese thought endured. 
Indeed, by the eighth century Buddhism in China had become successfully indigenized and had 
no meaningful contact with the Indian sources or interpretations from which it originally arose. 
By this time, according to Lusthaus (1998: G002SECT1), the Chinese had ‘lost interest in Indian 
commentaries and treatises and instead turned their attention toward Chinese commentaries on 
the Buddhist scriptures – such as the Lotus Sutra and Huayan Sutra – that had assumed 
importance for Chinese Buddhist traditions’. Tiantai, Huayan, Pure Land and Chan schools, as 
Chen (1964: 297) emphasizes, ‘were no longer Indian systems introduced into China, but were 
really schools of Chinese Buddhism’. From the tenth century Chan Buddhism was ‘essentially a 
Chinese product’ (Hsu 2001: 445) and from this time was established as one of the dominant 
teachings in China, along with Confucianism and Daoism. It is this school of Buddhism which 
later spread to Japan as Zen Buddhism, and becomes one of the most influential form of Buddhist 
teaching.  
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The translation of Buddhism from India to China did not only mean that it acquired a 
Chinese idiom but also that its philosophical concerns were closer to those of the Chinese 
intellectual traditions than the Indian. Chinese intellectual entrepreneurs modified ‘the antifamily 
and antisocial concepts of Buddhism in India … so that filial piety was still a virtue to be 
observed’ (Chen 1964: 486; see also Chen 1973: 14-64). Indeed, reincarnation was reinterpreted 
to be commensurate with and understood through ancestor worship. While Indian Buddhism was 
not concerned with the notion of human nature, for instance, and many schools even rejected the 
very concept of essential nature, intellectual entrepreneurs of leading schools of Chinese 
Buddhism during the Tang dynasty (618-907 AD) – under the influence of Confucian thought – 
inquired into and debated the concept of Buddha-nature. The two dominant schools of Buddhism 
during this period were the Huayan or Flower Garland School (Cook 1977) and the Tiantai or 
Lotus School (Swanson 1995). What principally distinguishes these schools is their 
understanding of human nature refracted through Mencius’s idea that human nature is inherently 
good. While the doctrines of the Huayan School held that Buddha-nature is essentially pristine 
and good, the Tiantai School held that Buddha-nature is not perfect and pure but contains 
elements of evil and impurities. Whereas the Huayan position reflects Mencius’s argument 
concerning the inherent goodness of human nature that of the Tiantai derives from the Daoist 
notion of paradoxical integration (Qi 2014). The Tiantai contention is that good and evil, pure 
and impure are complementary opposites and the Buddha-nature’s evil traits are necessary in 
order to understand and have compassion for ordinary sentient beings.  
In metaphysics also Chinese Buddhism has more in common with traditional Chinese 
teachings than it has with Indian Buddhism. Indian Buddhist doctrines are characterized by a 
number of fundamental dichotomies, including those between spirit or pure mind and the 
phenomenal world or matter, between being and non-being, existence and non-existence, 
between consciousness and bodily existence, and so on. Chinese Buddhist doctrines, on the other 
hand, tend to take a typically Chinese or ‘middle-path solution to the issue of duality’, as Lai 
(2008: 268) puts it, which is expressed in both the Tiantai and Huayan Schools of Buddhism, one 
proposing an integration of ‘consciousness and the phenomenal world’ and the other emphasizing 
‘the interdependence of everything’ (Lai 2008: 268), positions which derive from Daoist 
teachings.  
In the process of enculturation of Buddhism, intellectual entrepreneurs further 
transformed the Chinese cultural context. Indeed, institutional elements were borrowed from 
Buddhism in the organization of religious Daoism, and temple Daoists constructed a clergy by 
imitation of the religious orders of Buddhist monasteries (Hsu 2001: 445). They also adopted 
many ritual methods employed in Buddhism. During the Song dynasty (960-1279) the 
philosophical developments which produced Neo-Confucianism as a distinctive philosophy 
included borrowing from the now Chinese Buddhist system of thought (Fung 1953; see also 
Huang 1999). Buddhism’s metaphysics of nature was reconstructed and incorporated into neo-
Confucianism (de Bary 1959: 33). Zhu Xi, the authoritative formulator of neo-Confucianism 
appropriated significant elements of Buddhism philosophy (Huang 1999: 128) and used them to 
develop a cosmology, a set of metaphysical notions, a cluster of psychological concepts to 
strengthen the Confucianism tradition (Wright 1959: 90), and in doing so modified it 
significantly. Drawing on Buddhist’s li (absolute principle) and shi (facts or events) metaphysics 
Zhu Xi developed dialectic of li (principle) and qi (material-energy) (Lusthaus 1998: 
G002SECT14). Through these appropriations of Buddhist ideas Confucian intellectual 
entrepreneurs thus further transformed existing Chinese cultural norms to adjust it to the needs of 
a changing social and cultural milieu.  
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The diffusion of Indian Buddhism into China and its eventual sinicization occupied a long 
period of historical time, roughly from the first century until the ninth century AD, during which 
facilitating social, philosophical and religious changes played crucial roles, and the endeavours of 
intellectual entrepreneurs, such as Mou Tzu, were essential. It has been argued above that neither 
state sponsorship nor missionary activities were themselves sufficient for the Chinese acceptance 
of Indian Buddhism. Rather the development of religious Daoism in the second century provided 
a positive basis for the apprehension and integration of aspects of Buddhist ritual practices into 
Chinese developments by intellectual entrepreneurs which initiated a process of transformation of 
originally Indian ideas into Chinese terminology and conceptualization, harmonizing the alien 
thought and practices with pre-existing Confucian and Daoist concepts. By the sixth century 
distinctive doctrinal strands of Chinese Buddhism had been constructed, which related the 
debates that had shaped the philosophical development of both Confucianism and Daoism to a 
now recognizable Chinese Buddhism, distinct, and quite ‘separate from Indian Buddhism’ out of 
which it had ostensibly originated (Lai 2008: 235), although to put it this way neglects the 
Chinese sources from which it grew. The advent of a Chinese Buddhism was a significant factor 
in the transformation of the Chinese intellectual heritage on which it necessarily drew. 
Throughout the process of the sinicization of Buddhism the Chinese intellectual heritage which 
was the standard toward which it gravitated was never static and unchanging. The dynamic 
interaction between the different elements of China’s intellectual heritage which ensured its 
almost constant transformation continued after the consolidation of Buddhism’s sinicization.   
It is clear from the discussion above that its acceptance into China required that Buddhism 
was subjected to a process through which its terminology, philosophical concerns and general 
ethos were disconnected from its Indian origins and harmonized with prevailing Chinese 
concepts and understandings. It has been shown that the diffusion of Buddhism into China did 
not occur automatically but rather was achieved through the efforts of intellectual entrepreneurs 
who carefully selected elements of concern to Chinese subjects, combined them with local 
thought and transformed them in a way which harmonized them with a pre-existing intellectual 
heritage. 
 
Modern Ideas and Intellectual Entrepreneurs 
Modern Western ideas were first transmitted into China at a time of national humiliation 
through defeat in the Opium Wars of the mid-nineteenth century. Subdued by the superior 
weapons and tactics of the allied Western forces, China in defeat was forced to sign a number of 
‘unequal treaties’ which benefited Britain, France, Russia and the United States. These unequal 
treaties allowed a number of significant concessions to be made by China to Western powers, 
including the extraterritoriality and consular jurisdiction of foreigners in China, effectively 
removing foreigners on Chinese soil from the sanction of Chinese authority, restriction of the 
level of customs duties paid by foreigners, the provision of foreign settlements, concessions and 
leased territories within China, provision of freedom of movement for foreign ships in Chinese 
inland and territorial waters, legalization of the opium trade, freedom of missionary activities in 
China, and other concessions too numerous to mention (Spence 1999: 180-183). China’s 
subordination to Western powers through defeat in the Opium Wars provided foreigners with 
access to China’s economic resources but did not grant them political or cultural control over 
China. China was not formally colonized by Western powers as occurred during this period in 
Africa, the Pacific and South East Asia. 
The response to these foreign threats, encroachments and incursions took various forms. 
The official Chinese response was resigned capitulation reflecting political incapacity, entrenched 
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conservatism and intellectual malaise. Young urban Chinese, on the other hand, affronted by 
European incursion and embarrassed if not dismayed by official Chinese ineptitude and weakness 
began looking for intellectual and political solutions. One means of reasserting Chinese 
prerogative was to carefully select elements of Western knowledge that might be useful for a new 
development of China. This was not to overthrow existing patterns of thought and culture but to 
integrate and effectively localize foreign knowledge in order to attain its perceived power. There 
was a widespread hostility to Western forces among all classes of Chinese people, and a strong 
desire to not capitulate to or appropriate wholesale Western concepts, theories or practices. At the 
same time there was a growing recognition from the late nineteenth century that the best defense 
China had against Western power was the careful appropriation of those ideas and practices that 
were responsible for Western strength. In Chinese hands these would hold at bay the humiliation 
of China. The task of selecting and shaping Western concepts for Chinese development was 
executed by China’s young intellectual entrepreneurs.  
It would be naïve to claim that there was unanimous agreement among these Chinese 
intellectuals and officials about how Western knowledge should be treated. The intellectual 
entrepreneurs who endeavoured to transform and integrate Western knowledge into a reformed 
Chinese culture met with strong criticism and attacks from those who supported repudiation of 
Western ideas and preservation of China’s traditional thought and also those who called for 
wholesale Westernization and abandonment of Chinese traditional thought. The intellectual 
entrepreneurs discussed below argued that it was only through learning from the West that China 
could build up its power but at the same time that it was necessary that learning from the West 
did not entail capitulation to it and abandonment of a sense of Chineseness, of a national essence. 
The course selected by a significant number of intellectual entrepreneurs entailed the 
appropriation, transformation and integration of particular Western ideas useful for the defense 
and integrity of China against the West. 
The Chinese intellectuals who participated in these new developments were close to the 
Western and modern notion of intellectuals described by Gouldner (1979: 48) as a social type 
whose ‘interests are primarily critical, emancipatory, hermeneutic and hence often political’ who 
may ‘contribute to revolutionary leadership’. The critical and hermeneutic aspect of the 
intellectual’s practice is stressed by Hannerz (1990: 246) when he identifies the ability of 
intellectuals to both de-contextualize and re-contextualize knowledge. The dual process of de-
contextualizing and re-contextualizing European cultural ideas to best suit China’s needs was the 
task which principally identifies these developments. It must be noted, however, that the cultural-
intellectualistic approach employed did not itself derive from Western cultural forms. It was, 
rather, as Lin (1979: 49) says, ‘primarily molded by a deep-seated Chinese cultural predisposition 
as embodied in a monistic and intellectual mode of postclassical Confucian thinking’. One of the 
most important aspects of Confucianism lay in its emphasis on the primary function of 
intellectual experience. Although the doctrines of Confucianism were strongly attacked by a 
number of reforming intellectuals at this time, these reformers nevertheless practiced the values 
and form of Confucianism which emphasized learning, cultivation of mind and an ethical 
orientation in relations with others. Lin (1979: 50) explains that ‘the intellectualistic climate of 
opinion of Confucian culture was so pervasive and deeply embedded that a category of analysis 
of the Chinese intelligentsia was decisively molded by it without their being aware of the fact’. 
In assimilating Western concepts into a Chinese context these intellectual entrepreneurs 
would therefore at the same time also identify, strengthen and promote established or traditional 
concepts which were thought to be useful in a reconstructed national identity. They ‘appropriated 
Western ideas, adapted them to local conditions and used them to rethink, reevaluate and 
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reformulate the Chinese past and articulate visions of Chinese modernity’ (Fung 2010: 5). It will 
be shown here that the appropriation of European ideas by Chinese intellectuals at this time was 
therefore frequently in the context of an intellectual assimilation that paradoxically reinforced 
key aspects of the local elite culture through the sinicization of alien concepts. 
Although there was widespread agreement concerning the enormous differences between 
the Western and Chinese intellectual traditions some Chinese intellectual entrepreneurs began by 
discovering functional equivalents of Western ideas in China’s intellectual heritage. In the 
adaptation and assimilation of a Western concept, then, the concept in question was given a place 
in a pre-existing Chinese intellectual context. Through this translation the alien concept was 
transformed by being sinicized and the framework of the diffused ideas was provided with a 
vitality it may have previously lacked. For instance, Western individualism was seen by some 
intellectual entrepreneurs as having a parallel form in the libertarian and anti-authoritarian strands 
of Daoism. Similarly, the pragmatic and utilitarian approach to statecraft was seen to have 
Chinese precursors in the work of the fourth century BC thinker Mozi and the Legalist School of 
the same period (Furth 2002: 15-16). The nineteenth-century reformers and intellectual 
entrepreneurs Yan Fu (Yen Fu) and Liang Qichao (Liang Chi-chao) were able to locate germs of 
ancient democracy in Mencius’ idea that a ruler who failed to take note of popular opinion should 
be overturned (Mencius 2004: 121). More broadly, the Mandate of Heaven, which was not a 
doctrine of divine right but rather included the idea that rulership had to be merited by 
performance, and therefore implied a contingent right of rebellion, was seen to be reminiscent of 
the idea in Locke’s liberalism that the relationship between government and governed is one of 
trusteeship and that a breach of this trust justifies rebellion (Locke 1963: 348-350; 459-462). 
Even the idea of science as regulated observation of nature that developed in Europe was seen by 
some Chinese intellectual entrepreneurs as parallel to elements of Daoist naturalism, a position 
that resonates with Needham’s identification of the Daoist basis of traditional Chinese science 
(Needham 1956).  
The evolutionary thread that connects these notions is present in the work of the highly 
significant intellectual entrepreneur Yan Fu (1854-1921), who in 1898 translated and introduced 
Thomas Huxley’s Evolution and Ethics. This translation had a significant impact on Chinese 
thinkers at the time (Schwartz 1969: 98-112). Chinese intellectuals and young people during this 
period were inspired by the ideas of Darwinian natural selection and Herbert Spencer’s notion of 
the ‘survival of the fittest’. These ideas formed an ideological framework for major political, 
educational and cultural reforms in China. Yan Fu continued his efforts to diffuse into China 
Western philosophical, economic, social science and political ideas through further translations, 
including those of such major texts as Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, John Stuart Mill’s On 
Liberty and Herbert Spencer’s Study of Sociology. 
The perceived benefit to China of Social Darwinism encouraged Yan Fu to embrace it and 
in appropriating it to suit Chinese needs he transformed it.  Although Christian missionaries first 
brought Darwin to China his name was practically unknown to Chinese thinkers until Yan Fu 
began to write about him in 1895. Yan Fu’s introduction of Darwin and Darwinism to China was 
partial in the extreme as he accentuated and reinforced the idea of ‘survival of the fittest’ at the 
expense of a statement of the ‘full theory of evolution’ (Pusey 1983: 78). Yan Fu’s ultimate 
interest did not lie in exposition of a Western scientific theory but in its utilization for Chinese 
developmental purposes. In the aftermath of China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) 
Yan Fu saw the need for China to reform as a matter of survival. His introduction of the notion of 
‘survival of the fittest’ was to compel the Chinese government and people to face what he saw as 
the impending danger of China’s collapse. Yan Fu’s solution was to encourage the idea that the 
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Chinese people should work together as a group struggling for their nation’s survival. In his 
creative development of Darwinism Yan Fu fails to mention that Darwin’s conception of ‘the 
ultimate cause of the transformation of species’ derives from ‘the struggle within species’ (Pusey 
1983: 64). He turns instead to the early Confucian philosopher Xunzi, who held ‘that man is 
stronger than all animals because he can qun [group]’; in doing so Yan Fu completely sidesteps 
the competitive individualism that characterized Social Darwinism in Europe and America. For 
Yan Fu survival of the fittest pertains to the struggle between groups, and this is what he 
disseminated in his advocacy of Darwinian thought in late nineteenth century China. Yan Fu did 
not fail to understand Darwin’s theory of evolution but, on the contrary, he chose to interpret it in 
a way which he thought was meaningful to China’s circumstances. As an intellectual 
entrepreneur Yan Fu selected elements from the theory of evolution, combined them with aspects 
of Chinese resources and created entirely new notions. His endeavours were to ‘inaugurate a new 
age of philosophical Chinese thought’ (Pusey 1983: 78). 
Influenced by Adam Smith’s social theory, Yan Fu came to represent those who 
advocated the development of capitalist economy in China (Schwartz 2002: 103-105). What is of 
particular interest in this context, though, is that after completing a translation of Mill’s Logic 
Yan almost immediately went on, in 1903, to publish a series of marginal commentaries on a new 
edition of Lao-tzu’s (Laozi’s) Tao te ching (Daodejing). This was not only because, as Yan 
writes, that ‘only the views of Lao-tzu are compatible with the views of Darwin, Montesquieu, 
and Spencer’ (quoted in Schwartz 1969: 198) but also because, as Benjamin Schwartz (1969: 197) 
puts it, ‘Yen Fu’s universe had never been neatly divided into the two incommunicable spheres of 
“Chinese tradition” and “modern West”’. Yan Fu represented those thinkers who saw the 
necessity of adopting ideas from the West to be used in China’s best interest while also 
maintaining cultural nationalism, or ethno-nationalism. Ethno-nationalism is distinguished from 
civic nationalism by virtue of its connection with the ascribed cultural and historical 
characteristics of a people (or ethne), rather than with rights-based notions of national citizenship 
which are indifferent to cultural background (Connor 1994). Since ethno-nationalism conceives 
itself as an organic expression of popular consciousness, it is regarded as rooted in nature as well 
as history. Metaphors of awakening are thus understood by partisan nationalisms as the people 
resuming their natural dispositions (Holton 2005: 117).  
Yan Fu’s introduction of Darwinian and related thought into China was not a mere 
transplant of European ideas to Chinese soil. Rather it fits a general pattern in which Chinese 
intellectual and cultural borrowing involves practices in which Chinese intellectual entrepreneurs 
‘assimilated and responded creatively to Western ideas in various ways’ (Clarke 1997: 29). 
Rather than being Westernized particular intellectual entrepreneurs in China selected specific 
Western ideas which were then cautiously diffused into the existing ferment to better understand 
them, with Chinese thinkers and activists critically appraising their relevance for China’s self-
improvement. This process was conducted mainly to self-consciously resist and deflect foreign 
influence, and in the process strengthen China so that it did not imitate or become a ‘copy’ of the 
West. Through this process of selection, absorption and transformation the original Western 
concepts typically became part of an expanded and developing Chinese knowledge base, indeed 
become seemingly thoroughly assimilated elements of Chinese thought. 
Even though a conduit and active agent for the diffusion of modernizing Western texts in 
China it is not at all contradictory for Yan to sign a petition in 1913 circulated by the ‘Society for 
Confucianism’, supporting the idea that Confucianism could act as a stabilizing common faith in 
China (Schwartz 2002: 111). Yan made use of the resources of the classical Chinese 
philosophical vocabulary and in doing so provided an original interpretation of Western thought. 
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Although he was inspired by Spencer’s Social Darwinism, his view that intellectual change in 
China should be accomplished through education, as Schwartz points out, did not derive from 
Spencer. This idea can be sourced, rather, in Confucius’s ideal of the role of education in self-
cultivation and especially in his follower, Xunzi’s approach to education as underpinning moral 
development. Yan saw the value of Western thought for the modernization and revitalization of 
China, but his inspiration was rooted in the intellectual heritage of classical Chinese thought. Yan 
embraced Laozi’s skepticism and his acceptance of evolutionary necessity was deeply informed 
by Laozi’s anti-anthropomorphic naturalism (Furth 2002: 28; Tillman 1990: 64). For him, Laozi 
was the ‘antique source of a democratic spirit of personal independence and social “yielding”’ 
(Furth 2002: 36).  
Parallel to but independent of Yan, a similar sinicized Darwinism was developed by Kang 
Youwei who is remembered for the idea of datong (Grand Unity) (Kang 1958), in which 
evolutionary notions were seen to resonate with aspects of Chinese traditional thought. Inspired 
by Darwinian thought Kang developed a theory of progress that drew upon and elaborated a 
Confucian framework. From the idea of an evolution of historical formations, through the 
interaction between organism and environment, Kang developed the proto-socialist idea of a 
common sharing. He believed that the evolutionary process which led to the formation of new 
species through an organism’s adaptation to a changing environment would also lead to a growth 
of interdependence in human society which was productive of increasingly common sharing of 
environmental resources, including material wealth. Again, this is a conclusion quite opposite to 
the one drawn by the Social Darwinism that developed in Europe and America. Kang’s 
elaboration of evolutionary thought into economic equalitarianism is seen by Furth (2002: 20) as 
a development of Mencius’ idea of an extension of benevolence. It is just as likely, however, that 
Kang’s evolutionism drew upon similar ideas in philosophical Daoism as expressed in a number 
of chapters in Daodejing. In any event Kang’s evolutionism imbues the traditional Chinese 
concepts in the context of which it now operates with a new relevance and meaning. 
Although the endeavours of intellectual entrepreneurs were directed to the incorporation 
of Western modernism into Chinese consciousness it is important to appreciate how their doing 
so required at the same time fundamental modifications of the existing cultural framework. 
Inspired by Spencer’s three energies, the physical, intellectual and moral, Yan Fu developed the 
three people’s strengths, minli (people’s physical prowess), minzhi (people’s knowledge) and 
minde (people’s virtue) (Pusey 1983: 65). Through the development of the social organism of 
three people’s strengths, China would be able to be fit, to survive, and to advance. Rather than 
emphasizing moral ethics which was held in Confucianism to be the paramount factor for a 
state’s strength, Yan Fu attributed more significance to minli (people’s physical prowess) and 
minzhi (people’s knowledge). It is this latter emphasis on the formative capacities of the people 
that violates the core of Confucian ethics and the Confucian world-view itself. Confucian ethics 
is based on the five cardinal relationships set out in the Mencius (2004: 60), but found in other 
classical sources including the Yijing (I Ching) and the Zhongyong (Doctrine of the Mean), 
namely those between father and son, sovereign and subject, husband and wife, elder and 
younger brother, and between friends. Ethical relations between persons require compliance to 
these particular roles which, with the exception of the last one, are structured vertically between 
superior and inferior. The emphasis on learning and self-cultivation in the Confucian system is to 
achieve role compliance of and within these cardinal relationships. There is an additional 
distinction in Confucian ethics, the distinction between the ethical responsibilities of ordinary 
people and of scholars. Ordinary people are required to practice self-cultivation in the sphere of 
family and community life but scholars must engage in self-cultivation in order to have 
Intellectual Entrepreneurs & Ideas Diffusion 
 16 
responsibility for the distribution of cultural, social and political resources in the empire. It goes 
without saying that scholars are superior to ordinary people, who must respect their superiors. 
Yan Fu’s idea of people’s strength, necessary for his project, visibly and flagrantly challenged 
and violated the elitist core of Confucian ethics. It is interesting to notice that Kang circumvented 
the Confucian framework by not even including morality in his discuss of strength, but only 
acknowledged ‘physical strength’ and ‘intellectual strength’. Obviously, ‘[a] nation’s level of 
“evolution” for Kang was mainly judged in terms of materialistic achievements’ (Wong 2010: 
111). Though morality is included in Yan Fu’s account, it was completely different from 
Confucianism’s interpretation as an individual’s giving up everything for righteousness. Yan Fu 
redefined it as public-spiritedness, which required that Chinese people work together selflessly 
for their nation’s survival and strength (Pusey 1983: 66). The resistance of the literati and other 
defenders of the Confucian order of late Qing China to Yan and Kang was strenuous but 
ineffective as their own social and cultural power was undermined by Western demonstrations of 
the political ineffectiveness of the Qing Empire. 
The contribution to Chinese intellectual innovation provided by Yan and Kang, among 
others, laid a foundation which was necessary to the New Culture Movement, which began in 
1919, that relied on acceptance of the Darwinian premise of natural selection and Spencer’s idea 
of the ‘survival of the fittest’. According to the view expressed by the New Culture Movement, in 
order to survive in the modern world the Chinese citizen was required to be ‘the fittest’. How this 
fitness was to be achieved required further transformation of the typical Western understanding 
of the evolutionary principle through two qualifications that were essentially Chinese in character. 
First, the ‘new citizen’ was not an individualized entity of the type located in Western thought 
but imbued with the Chinese quality of connectedness. The idea of connectedness in this sense 
was drawn from both the Confucian tradition, in which individuals did not operate in terms of 
narrowly conceived self-interest but saw their individuality in terms of incontestable moral 
responsibilities to others, and the Daoist conception of natural interconnectedness of persons 
through the unavoidable effect on all of the actions of any one person. The ‘new citizen’, then, 
while not collective was not an isolated self-sufficient individual, as in Western liberal theory. 
Whereas western theory is transformed by intellectual entrepreneurs through their introduction of 
it to a Chinese milieu, in remolding and infusing Western modernism into a Chinese cultural 
framework, intellectual entrepreneurs reshaped the local context itself. The traditional Chinese 
notions of interconnectedness and relationality were in this new conceptualization disconnected 
from the Confucian ideas of filiality in which moral responsibility is principally in familial 
relations of obligation of son to father and the hierarchies of gender and political relations that 
parallel kinship roles. In this new and refashioned conception of the moral relations between 
persons, individuals are conceived in their necessary relations not to family members but to the 
Chinese nation itself.  
This loosening of the traditional Chinese conception of the connectedness of individuals 
from the Confucian idea of filiality or family obligation and loyalty to Emperor and locating it 
rather in the modernist notion of ‘nation’ provides the context for the second qualification of the 
typical Western understanding of the evolutionary principle developed by the new Culture 
Movement. In this Movement the ‘new citizen’ was characterized as dynamic, self-assertive and 
able, qualities which the New Culture Movement saw as the basis of Western power and ability. 
However, these were qualities conceived by the Movement as not primarily a description of 
capacities applied to individual persons. Rather, this characterization of the ‘new citizen’ was 
intended to be a mobilizing force in creating a new collective Chinese self-image, directed 
against the conventional stereotype of Chinese passivity and resignation which was not only 
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ascribed to Chinese by unsympathetic foreigners but at this time had come to form an element of 
the Chinese self-image, reflecting not only China’s defeat at the hand of Western powers but the 
inability of Chinese political leaders, Republican as well as Imperial, to re-assert China’s 
prerogatives in its relations with foreign powers or provide security to Chinese citizens at home.  
The New Culture Movement led by intellectual entrepreneurs was therefore neither a 
movement of wholesale adoption of Western ideas and repudiation of Chinese traditions, nor a 
movement simply dedicated to preserving Chinese mores and conceptualizations of behaviour 
and social forms. It was a movement, which as Yu (2001: 313) observes, promoted 
‘simultaneously the importation of Western thought and scholarship on the one hand and the 
“systematic reorganization of national heritage” on the other’. In their employment of Western 
thought the Chinese intellectual entrepreneurs associated with the New Culture Movement 
carefully selected concepts and theories they saw as useful to China which they then creatively 
transformed through a synthesis with traditional Chinese categories and approaches, thus 
assimilating them into existing patterns of Chinese concepts and theories. What has been seen 
here, though, is that not all Chinese concepts and theories were equally thought to be an 
appropriate base for the amalgam of ideas that was to form Chinese modernism. In the 
sinicization of Western ideas there is associated modification of the ‘receiving’ Chinese 
framework. In the transformation and incorporation of an alien concept the resulting framework 
of the local receiving thought is itself adjusted, modified and transformed. The creative 
reconstitution of old traditions which is the result of the endeavours of intellectual entrepreneurs 
is continuous with the formation of new combinations which is their primary objective. The 
emerging new traditions are no less Chinese as the alien concepts incorporated into them are 
sinicized in the process. It is clear, then, that the work of the intellectual entrepreneurs and the 
products they provide to others in their milieu cannot be described as mere translations. 
 
Conclusion 
It has been shown through two quite different historical cases that knowledge flow 
through the diffusion of concepts and theories from one culture or society to another requires the 
active engagement of a category of agents identified in the discussion as intellectual 
entrepreneurs. Intellectual entrepreneurs are the key players in this process who initiate, facilitate 
and carry out conceptual transformation and amalgamation that accompanies and realizes cultural 
borrowing. Intellectual entrepreneurs do not simply translate or transfer externally sourced ideas 
into an established context. Rather, they select elements from not one but two contexts, from the 
body of foreign ideas from which ‘useful’ notions are appropriated and from the local established 
traditions into which these ideas or concepts are placed. By combining elements from these two 
contexts the intellectual entrepreneur makes something quite new that had not previously existed 
and which can operate as a newly introduced knowledge only if the resistance of the established 
culture has been overcome. In this way knowledge is transferred or diffused from one culture to 
another. But it is no longer the original knowledge nor is the receiving context unchanged and the 
same as it was before.  
Of all the elements of the intellectual entrepreneur’s many connected activities perhaps 
the least appreciated is their overcoming the resistance the local culture presents to the new 
amalgam of ideas drawn from a foreign source and melded with familiar notions. Indeed, the 
concept of resistance is more complex than it first appears and contains a number of different 
possibilities not all of which are ever realized in any given episode. Resistance can be frictional 
or purposive, passive or forceful; it can be subversive or conflictual (Barbalet 1985). Discussion 
in conventional sources gives the impression that there was little or no resistance to the 
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assimilation of Buddhism into China. It is shown above, however, that Mou Tzu primarily 
addresses opposition to Buddhism rather than simply advocating its virtues. Resistance to 
Buddhism took many forms: Buddhism was simply ignored when it was first introduced into 
China but also treated with contempt and disdain when its presence was felt. The Confucian 
opposition to Buddhism generated a number of polemic texts, especially during the Six dynasties 
period (222-589), many of them preserved in two compilations, the Collected Essays on 
Buddhism by Sengyou (Seng-yu) (445-518) and the Further Collection of Essays on Buddhism 
(Xu gaoseng zhuan) by Daoxuan (596-667) (Fung 1953: 284). The Tang dynasty (618-907) saw 
an ascendant Buddhism which only encouraged the inventiveness of Confucian resistance. The 
Neo-Confucian revival of this period incorporated aspects of Buddhist metaphysics and thereby 
nullifying the Buddhist claims on Chinese thought. There was also careful and insistent Daoist 
resistance which took subtle forms, unfortunately misunderstood by many scholars. Indeed, the 
established literature portrays Daoism as simply capitulating to Buddhism, surrendering basic 
tenets and assimilating Buddhist ideas and practices. In a careful analysis of key Daoist texts, the 
Lingbao Scriptures, Bokenkamp (2010: 204) on the contrary shows that the authors of these 
scriptures ‘rather than “surrendering” to Buddhist ideas, explicitly manipulate them in ways that 
served to reassert traditional Chinese values’ against the original Buddhist notions of ‘individual 
responsibility of karmic predestination’. Indeed, Bokenkamp shows that the assertion of familial 
responsibility in the Lingbao Scriptures was in turn assimilated into the way Buddhism was 
practiced in China. 
The form and degree of resistance to western ideas in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries was much more immediate and prevalent than the resistance to Buddhism. The national 
malaise caused by imported opium from British India, national humiliation generated by defeat in 
the Opium Wars, and the national burden of debt imposed by foreign encroachment were all felt 
across China and by all classes. Anti-west sentiment was widely shared and opposition to modern 
ideas was intensely manifest. Against such resistance the work of modernist intellectual 
entrepreneurs generated the combustive power that marked the intellectual vigor and challenge of 
the period. The introduction of foreign ideas into China at this time and their assimilation into the 
receiving culture was palpably the result of the efforts of dedicated intellectual entrepreneurs, 
made especially visible through their overcoming the resistance and not simply the inertia of 
traditional notions and practices.  
Any discussion of the assimilation of foreign concepts into a different intellectual culture 
is required to identify the mechanisms through which concepts are ‘diffused’ from one context to 
another. This paper makes a contribution to our understanding of these processes by identifying 
and examining the role of ‘intellectual entrepreneurs’ in knowledge transfer. The activities of 
intellectual entrepreneurs have been examined in order to indicate the processes through which 
alien concepts and theories are diffused into a receiving culture. It has been shown that foreign 
intellectual sources did not simply pass into Chinese culture and consciousness but rather 
particular ideas were self consciously selected by intellectual entrepreneurs on the basis of how 
these ideas might contribute to dealing with problems at both the individual and socio-political 
levels in China. This general or abstract statement of diffusion has an added political dimension 
in the case of China from the mid-nineteenth century. The identification of the role of intellectual 
entrepreneurs and the treatment of the processes they initiate has wide future application in 
understanding social and cultural change through inter-cultural concept transfer. 
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